OPINION / Two years later, where are we?

By Jim Giermanski

    In 2007, I wrote two articles on why 100 percent scanning was not doable. I laid out four fundamental reasons why 100 percent scanning would not work: its foreign acceptance, its limitation to seaports only, the non-existence of required technology, and the non-inclusion of land ports within the concept of critical infrastructure.

Two years later, where are we?

In October 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report entitled, SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY -- Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers, in which the GAO concluded, in general, that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has made limited progress in scanning containers, "leaving the feasibility of 100 percent scanning largely unproven." Furthermore, “CPB faces a number of potential challenges in integrating the 100 percent scanning requirement into its existing container security programs...,” said the GAO report, which concluded what I predicted back in 2007. 

Here are four reasons why 100 percent scanning won’t work:

1.    Foreign acceptance   

    In June 2008, the World Customs Organization (WCO) refused to support 100 percent scanning saying that it would, “be detrimental to world trade and could result in unreasonable delays, port congestion, and international trading difficulties.” In May 2008, the European Parliament called for the U.S. to repeal the 100 percent scanning requirement, and the report added: “Government officials from Europe, Asia, and the Middle East that we spoke with have stated that the SFI program and 100 percent scanning are primarily for the security benefit of the United States and, as such, they are unwilling to pay for this security initiative. Further, officials from the World Bank and the WCO with whom we spoke stated that implementing 100 percent scanning would likely create additional shipping costs in certain parts of the world because of changes in trade routes that would be necessary.”

2.    Seaports-only appropriateness

    The report notes that, “C-TPAT members that transfer cargo by truck to the United States from Canada or Mexico will not be affected by the requirement. However, given that other companies who use maritime shipping may lose an incentive for joining C-TPAT or maintaining membership, the potential security benefit associated with the program could be diminished to the extent that C-TPAT membership does not grow or decreases.” The costs and time delays in attempting to scan 100 percent of cargo are impediments to acceptance by the commercial private sector. The report further noted the requirement to implement 100 percent scanning might actually risk the willingness of private companies to partner with CBP to improve their internal security programs since the benefits of faster CBP processing would disappear if implemented. The report recommended that CBP conduct feasibility analyses, develop comprehensive cost estimates to include alternatives to 100 scanning, and present its results to Congress.

3.    Appropriate technology

    It was determined that the scanning technology employed at participating foreign ports and U.S. ports is still not at the level of accuracy and reliability needed to reveal all that a container may contain. There are further concerns related to safety, logistical problems with containers transferred from rail or other vessels, scanning equipment breakdowns and poor quality scan images. “Every time responsibility for cargo in containers changes hands along the supply chain there is the potential for a security breach. As a result, vulnerabilities exist that terrorists could take advantage of by, for example, placing a WMD into a container for shipment to the United States or elsewhere,” the report noted.

 In addition to the time, costs and risks of acceptance by the U.S. commercial private sector, the technology itself is subject to weather, accuracy, unacceptable false/positive rates, fear of injury and the reliability of currently available technology.
 
4.     Land ports as critical infrastructure

    Critical infrastructure funds are still not available at land ports-of-entry to accommodate and install a 100 percent scanning requirement. The only reference to land ports-of-entry in the GAO report was a reference indicating that Mexican and Canadian commercial container/trailer traffic will “not be affected by the requirement.”

My alternative

    The report has estimated that the costs for scanning to meet federal legislation could go as high as $1.6 billion. As I observed in 2007, there is an "in-container" detection alternative that will not cost the government the millions -- if not billions -- to accomplish what scanning cannot. In fact, under certain circumstances, the private sector would be happy to accommodate CBP's needs and provide a zero cost alternative, especially since DHS has proven itself incapable of developing even one basic Container Security Device (CSD) on the shelf, ready for use.

In its own words, the DHS Science & Technology Directorate “began developing Container Security Device (CSD) technology in 2006 in response to a requirement from CBP.  The numbers reported below for CSD development, testing and evaluation are approximate as work (primarily T&E) for the CSD the Advanced Container Security Device technologies were funded via a single contract and conducted in tandem.